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MEMORIAL SERVICES.
It is with pleasure that we note the interest that was taken by the law students
in paying tribute to their deceased classmate and brother, Christian E. Lauer, in
the memorial services which were held in
Bosler Hall, Nov. 16, 1900. Here follows
the program of the memorial service:
Hymn 188--Epworth Hymnal, p. 134,
"Lead Kindly Light."
SCRIPTURE LESSONS,

Prof. J. Henry Morgan, Ph. D.
Psalm 90; Ecc. 12:1-7,13,14.
College Quartette.
SELECTION,
Prof. Morris W. Prince, S. T. D.
PRAYER,
ADDRESs--Commemorative

of the late Christian

E. Lauer, School of Law, Class 1901,
Mr. William E. Elmes.
College Quartette.
SELECTION,
ADDRESs-Commemorative of the late Clifford 0.
Webster, Dickinson College, Class 1902,
Mr. William W. Betts.
ADDRESS-Commemorative of the late John Wynn,
Dickinson College, Class 1902.
Mr. Frank T. Bell.
President Reed.
CLOSING REMARKS,
HYMN 21-Epworth Hymnal, p. 21,
"Abide with Me! Fast Falls the Eventide."
BENEDICTION.

Committee-Wi. I. Reed, Wim. H. Decker, W. L.
Moore, Chas. A. Piper.

Mr. Wm. E. Elmes delivered an excellent address, in which he payed fitting

tribute to the gentleman in whose honor
the services were held. The following is
part of Mr. Elmes' address:
In presenting to you some of the facts
relative to the life of our deceased brother
of the Law School, I cannot but feel my
inability to adequately convey in words
the tribute which so exemplary a life
merits. Through many years he toiled
and.struggled to attain the goal of youthful ambition, and when it was almost in
sight he was called from earth.
A brief sketch of his life will, perhaps,
better than anything else, serve to show
its dominating principle, and the zeal
with which he pursued it, for, scattered
all through that history, and permeating
every act of our brother, is found patient
self-sacrifice, fidelity to duty, and unceasing endeavor.
Christian E. Lauer was born near Reading, Pa., June 15, 1869, and was killed at
his post of duty, at Ridge street, Philadelphia, August 19, 1900, aged 31 years 2
months and 4 days.
When about two years of age his parents
moved to Reading, remaining nine years.
His father having died in the meantime,
his mother, out of her great love for her
three sons, and the consciousness of the
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numerous temptations which surround
the life of a youth in the city, deemed it
best to return to the country.
Here Christ. took up the life of an ordinary country boy, working on the farm
during the summer and attending school
in tie winter.
When seventeen years old an eagerness
possessed him to acquire a broader education than the limited facilities of the country schools afforded, and, to the end that
he might obtain the necessary funds, he
secured a position in a rolling mill, serving first as a helperon a puddlingfurnace,
subsequently as a puddler. After a year
in the mill, he attended one term at the
His
Kutztown State Normal School.
funds exhausted, he returned to the mill,
and after another year's interval here succeeded in graduating from Kutztown.
Still he aspired to higher intellectual
attainments, and after teaching six years
in the public schools entered Lafayette
College, graduating in 1899. His vacations, if indeed they might be called such,
were spent as conductor on oe of the
street car lines of Atlantic City.
Having graduated at Lafayette, he
looked forward to the completion of his
education by a course in our own beloved
institution, the Dickinson School of Law.
You all know how he came among us,
a modest, unassuming fellow, who had
ere long won our confidence by those selfsame qualities; our respect, by his wellknown studious habits, and his abilit.y in
the classroom; andouradmiration, by his
skill on the athletic field.
At the close of the term he accepted a
position as brakeman on an express train,
running between Atlantic City and Broad
street, Philadelphia.
During the summer he worked steadily,
making not only his own regular trips but
many extra ones. It was upon one of the
latter that lie met his death. On the
evening in question the train to which he
had been assigned left Atlantic City at
7.30. As it entered Philadelphia it was
run without materially lessening its speed
over a freight track parallel with the main
line for the purpose of passing an outgoing train. At a certain time, according
to the schedule, it was the duty of the
rear brakeman to look ahead for signals

that he might know how to set his lamps
on the rear of the train. It is supposed
that, unconscious of danger, probably not
knowing that the train was on aside track,
Christ. was in the act of looking for signals
when he was struck by a projecting girder
of an overhead bridge and instantly
killed.
Our brother has reached that undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveler ever returns. No more on earth shall
we have the benefit of his kindly presence,
his encouraging smile, his cheering vords,
but his memory shall live; the remembrance of his sacrifices in the pursuit of
an education, in his endeavor to build up
and perfect his highest and noblest nature
shall be the instrument in tiding us over
many a discouragement and inspiring us,
though all seems dark, to press forward
with renewed energy. Will we not remember this increasing endeavor for fourteen years in the accomplishment of a
seven-year course? Can we imagine that
there were not innumerable times when to
a man of his mental ability it was very
discouraging to see the end s6 far off; to
be compelled to leave his own classesf drop
behind for a year or more, that he Wight
replenish his bank account in order to
continue, yet he never faltered; no more
should we. No higher praise can be given
to any life than to his-he lived up to his
opportunities. This is success; nothing
else is success. To be true to the duty of
the hour is all that God requires of man.
There is no other way to life's choicest
prizes than this way of fearlessly, faithfully facing each succeeding opportunity,
and using it to the extent of one's ability.
Success is merely acceptance of opportunities.
Much is said and written as to the
splendid and unsurpassed advantages
which the youth of to-day have in the
way of educational facilities. True, that
with the increabing endowments pouring
into the colleges; educational facilities in
the way of equipment, larger scope of subjects taught, and modern appliances, we
witness a perfection which has never before existed. But how about the student?
They tell us that anyone can get an education who desires it; that cost is at a
minimum and all that, but here we have
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an example: a man at the age of thirtyone years, who had left no stone unturned,
no opportunity pass by for his advancement, who was of such intellectual capacity that he was always, when in school,
in the front rank of his class and yet had
spent fourteen years in covering a sevenyear course. Look at the example and
tell me if the perseverance necessary did
not amount almost, if not quite, to
heroism.
And, my friends, there are
other heroes in Carlisle. Daily they walk
the streets, ofttimes all thought of study
driven from their minds by the realization
thatone term bill or anotheris due and they
have not the wherewithall to pay. The
student life is, more often than is generally
supposed, filled with stern realities. Let
us not, then, pass our fellow students by
without a kind and encouraging smile or
a cheering word, for we know not when
we pass a hero, or what hardships some of
our fellows undergo, or what great lesson
even the life of the most humble is designed to teach. May we remember that
" No stream from its source

Flows seaward, how lonely soever its course,
But what some land is gladdened. No star ever rose
And set without influence somewhere. Who
knows
What earth needs from earth's lowest creature?
No life
Can be pure in its purpose and strong in its strife,

And all life not be purerand stronger thereby."
Learn, then, a lesson from the life of
our dear brother; a lesson of noble selfsacrifice; fidelity to duty; singleness of
purpose; singular perseverance. May it
spur us on to Increased endeavor, may the
low descending sun ever view from our
hands some worthy action done; may we
have no wasted moments but may the
cessation of our lives find us at our posts
of duty, valiantly struggling onward and
upward.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the past month the work of this
society has been of the very highest order,
and the attendance has been excellent.
The enthusiasm shown and the interest
taken in the welfare and progress of the
society augurs well for a most successful
year.
Many interesting and able papers have

been given before the society, and general
debates held thereon well calculated to
develop the quality of ready speech. The
department of extemporaneous speaking
has received special attention, and a practice has been inaugurated of preparing
slips on subjects, and requiring the speaker
to come forward and select one at random,
and speak thereon. Among the most interesting events of the past month was a
decidedly able talk, given by Kaufman, of
the Junior class, on a poem of Heinrich
Heine, the great German poet.
The executive committee are engaged in
preparing many interesting and nqvel
programs for future presentation, and with
the successful meetings we have already
held, and those to come, we hope to round
out a year of achievement second to none
in the history of the society.
The second annual inter-society debate
is now an assured fact, and committees
from the two societies have the arranging
of details, in their hands. The Allison
committee of arrangements is composed of
Messrs. Valentine, Piper and Graul.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The meetings during the past month
have been of unusual interest. The debates recently held have brought to the
notice of the society considerable ability
along this line. The expediency of a six
years' term for the President of the Uinited
States was discussed by Messrs. Gerber
and Points favoring the longer term, and
Messrs. Vastine and Detrick opposing it.
The old but ever-important question of
"Women's Rights" was debated by
Mr. Hess and Mr. J. Rhodes on one side,
and Mr. Hoagland and Mr. Henderson
on the other. The constitutionality and
policy of the "Grandfathers' Act," recently
passed by the Legislature of North Carolina, were ably considered by Messrs.
Jones and Williamson on the affirmative
side, and Messrs. Bishop and Sterrett on
the negative. At the several meetings
orations and recitations have been rendered by various members. Among those
who thus took part were Claycomb,
Mowry and F. H. Rhodes. Numerous
"extemporaneous speeches " have filled
out the programs, and afforded much ben-
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efit and entertainment. The inaugural
address of the new president was expressive of his zeal in the society work.
At a recent meeting steps were taken
towards revising the constitution, it being
generally felt that certain changes in that
instrument would facilitate the work of
the organization. At the last regular
meeting, held December 7th, the amendments proposed by the committee were,
with a few exceptions, adopted by the society.
On the same evening the committee to
arrange for the inter-society debates having reported their acceptance of a challenge to debate from the committee representing the Allison society, a motion commending this action of the committee was
unanimously passed.
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The Delta Chi Fraternity is continuing
its unparalleled course of prosperity. During the past month the membership has
been increased by the admission of the
following men: M. B. Sterrett, '02, G. M.
Thorne, '03, P. A. A. Core, '02, and J. D.
Crary, '03.
The most optimistic anticipations at the
beginning of the school year have been far
surpassed by the unprecedented progress
and advance that has been made thus far,
and the balance of the year bids fair to
emulate the present era of success.
The Decennial Reunion and Banquet,
held at Ithaca on the 24th ult., was represented by this Chapter in the persons of
P. Mvi. Graul, '01, and H. P. Katz, '01.
They report a most successful anniversary,
and are greatly pleased with the flourishing condition of affairs in the Cornell
Chapter.
The repairs and the several changes
made in the local rooms during the past
summer have worked a remarkable
chhnge therein, and the quarters now present an appearance of almost entirely new
apartments.
PRIZES.
The William C. Allison prize is offered
this year to such member of the Senior
class as produces the best essay on the
Landlord's Remedy of Distress.

The first Dean's prize is offered to such
member of the Middle class as produces
the best briefs in cases heard in the Moot
Court during the January-June term of
1901.
The second Dean's prize is offered to
the member of the Junior class that shall
excel in examination on Real Property.
The William D. Boyer prize No. 1 is
offered to that member of the Middle class
that does the best work in the Law of
Evidence.
The William D. Boyer prize No. 2 is
offered to such member of the Middle class
as produces the best essay on the Law of
Attorneys.
The William D. Boyer prize No. 3 is
offered for the best examination on Torts
by some member of any of the teamsfootball, baseball or track.
The William D. Boyer prize No. 4 is
offered for the best essay on the criminal
law of False Pretences in Pennsylvania
by a member of the football, baseball or
track-team.
The Edward Thompson Company prize
is offered to the member of any class that
shall produce the best essay on Debtor's
Exemption in Pennsylvania.
All competitors for these prizes must be
enrolled as such with the Dean before the
20th day of January 1901.
There must be at least three contestants
for the first five prizes. For, the William
'D. Boyer prizes, No. 3 and No. 4, there
must be two contestants.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Walter Taylor, '00, was admitted to the
Trenton Bar, he having passed a very
credible examination before the board of
examiners.
H. Stanley Winlack, '00, spent a few
days in town about November l1th.
Bruce H. Campbell, '96, was a visitor in
town during the latter part of November.
He gave a very creditable account of himself.
J. George Heist, '00, passed an excellent
examination before the Philadelphia Bar
Committee, and was admitted to practice
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in the several courts of the county. He is
located at 601-2 Lippincott Building, Philadelphia.

We are in receipt of a very pleasant letter from L. Philip Coblentz, '00, stating
that he is at present taking a three years'
course in one at the University of Baltimore; also wishes to be remembered to his
many friends at this institution.
Warren I. Henderson, '94, was elected
a director in the Huntingdon and Clearfield Telephone Company, a corporation
chartered by the State Nov. 22, 1900.

Capt. Hess reports that the team has
not as yet been chosen, but states that
there are many candidates for the several
positions on the team and that the material far excels that of last year.
Taylor, '01, and Hogland, '03, Law, and
Shuman and Powell of the College, are
very promising candidates and will probably be members of the team.
Amerman, '02, will captain the football
team next year.

Bushong, of the firm of Miller & Bushong,
York, was in town recently on business.
He stated that Miller, '00, his partner,
gained quite a reputation as a campaign
speaker in York county during the recent
campaign.
Charles E. Daniels, '98, reports having a
large plactice, and is getting along nicely.
Harrison J. Walker, '96, again makes a
decided hit by winning a homicide case
in Centre county. The jury returned a
verdict, after 45 minutes' deliberation, of
not guilty. Walker was the attorney for
the defendant, and has reasons to feel
proud over his victory.
Mferkel Landis, '99, has returned from
Minneapolis and other points in the west,
and has decided to locate in Charlestown,
W. Va., where he has been admitted to
the bar.
Frank H. Strouss, '98, was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Northumberland county on Tuesday, December 4,
1900.
Charles Shambaugh, '99, has left for
West Virginia, where he expects to locate
and open a law office.
J. Kirk Bosler, '99, has purchased the
American Volunteer, a paper published
semi-weekly at Carlisle.
The football season having drawn to a
close, the many friends of basketball will
have a chance to witness some very interesting games to be played between Dickinson and other institutions of note.

W. HARRISON WALKER.
The graduates of the school have generally met with a fair degree of success and
we are pleased to note that W. Harrison
Walker, of the Class of '96, has gained
quite a reputation in the line of oratory
and eloquence, and think that a brief outline of his life would not be amiss at this
time.
He was born at Salone, Pa., Aug. 30,
1874, and attended Normal School at Lock
Haven and college at Susquehanna University, graduating in the Class of '94.
He then entered the Dickinson Law
School in October of the same year and
registered in office of Hon. W. F. Sadler;
he graduated from here in Class of '96.
After this, his admission to Cumberland
county bar and also Centre county bar
soon followed, and he at once began to
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practice as junior member of the firm of
Fortney & Walker. Since then he has
acquired a large and lucrative practice
and has been interested in niany important cases, both civil and criminal, arising
in that (Centre) county.
While at this school he was initiated
into Delta Chi Fraternity, and is also a
member of Masonic Fraternity, Knights
Templar and of the B. P. 0. E. at Lock
Haven.
He delivered the address to soldiers and
citizens of Phillipsburg on May 30, 1900,
and in appreciation of his services Post
No. 90, G. A. R., adopted resolutions
warmly thanking him and also complimenting him for his able effort.
On Sunday, Dec. 2, 1900, he delivered
the annual memorial address at Renovo,
Pa., for Lock Haven Lodge, B. P. O. E.,
before fifteen hundred people, and on this
occasion he was highly complimented by
the .Renovo -Newsof the following day for
his logical and powerfuil address.
During February last he was Democratic
nominee, for burgess of Bellefonte and was
defeated by only nine votes, running
much ahead of his ticket. His prospects
for the future are very bright and THE
Fonum congratulates Mr. Walker on his
success.
The following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Court
cases issued in last month's FoRum:
PLAINTIFF.

Case No. 42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

"4

". 48.

"

"1 49.

50.

"

"

51.

.

52.

"

53.
54.

DEFENDANT.

Conry,
Fox,
Bishop.
Ebbert.
Katz, J.
I
"38.
Helriegle,
Keeler,
Jones.
Lambert.
Kemp, J.
,C
39. Lonergan,
McGuffie,
Miller.
Vastine.
Kennedy, J.
"
" 39J. Gery,
Brooks,
Lord.
Hardesty.
Piper, J.
"
" 40. Hess,
Johnston,
Conry.
Katz.
Clark, J.
S" A41. Shipman,
Taylor,
Valentine.
Kemp.
Basehore, J.

55.

Case No. 37.

"

"

56.

"57.

58.

Walsh,

Watson,

Stauffer,W.T. Nichols.
Hess, J.
Core,
Deaver,
Williamson.
Elder.
Stauffer, W. T.
Phillips,
Wright,
Kaufman.
Yeagley.
Shipman, J.
Brooks,
Conry,
Welsh.
Rogers.
Kline, Dan., J.
Deal,
Katz,
Lauer.
Schnee.
Taylor, J.
Sterrett, H.
Rhodes, F.
Kostenbauder. Moon.
Valentine, J.
Delaney,E.A. Delaney,L.R
Claycomb.
Mundy.
Henderson, J.
McKeehan,
Basehore,
Brennan.
Stauffer,C.M
Mitchell, J.
Gery,
Conry,
Adamson.
Cooper.
Kern, J.
Lightner,
Clark,
Harpel.
Graul.
Mitchell,
Henderson,
Frank.
Hess.
Deal, J.
Holcomb,
Kline, Dan.
Johnston.
Piper.
Lonergan,
McIntire,
Points.
Minnich.
Lightner, J.
Gery,
Turner,
Adamson.
Boyer.
Barr,
Drumheller,
Osborne.
Elmes.
Edwards, J.
Rhodes, J.
Thorne,
Trude.
MacConnell.
Alexander, J.
Sherbine,
Crary,
Fox.
Kline, Chas.
Gery, J.
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should be postponed and paid only after
his judgment is fully satisfied.
Although it is true that Burley was at
one time a privileged creditor by virtue of
IN RE. WARING'S ESTATE.
his having secured a judgment against
Exceptions to auditor'sreport--Judgment Waring, yet by his negligence in not recreaitor.
viving said judgment he has lost the advantage that he once possessed. The Act
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
of April 4, 1798, 1 P. & L. 2471, limits the
continuance of alien of a judgment to five
On June 5, 1892, Joseph Burley obyears from the first return day of the term
tained judgment against Robert Waring
of which such judgment was entered; this,
for $1,250. On April 8, 1900, Robert Warunless a scirefac!as to revive such judging made an assignment in trust for the
ment be sued out within such term of five
benefit of his creditors toO. 0. Templeton,
years. The language of the statute is unEsq. In due time an auditor was apmistakable, and the cases based on it are
pointed by the court to distribute the
also directly against the exceptant.
funds in the hands of the assignee. The
Burley obtained his judgment in 1892,
funds for distribution are the proceeds
from the sale of lands owned by the as- I and since then he has taken no steps to
continue its life. We think, therefore, by
signor at the date of the Burley judgment.
virtue of the Act of 1798, such judgment
No scirefaciaswas issued or other means
creditor has lost the advantage which he
taken to revive the judgment held by
once had, and is in no better position
Burley. The auditor in his report treated
than the general creditors. That the lien
it as a common debt, and awarded it a
of a judgment is lost if not revived within
dividend merely with the general credthe prescribed five years, as against the
itors. Burley filed exceptions to the revoluntary assignee for the benefit of credport, claiming the auditor erred in not
itors, has been decided several times by
giving his claim preference and paying it
!a full, to the exclusion of the general
the Supreme Court of this state. Fulton's
creditors.
Estate, .51 Pa. Stat. 204, and Stirk's ApALExANDER and HENDERSON for ex- peal, 2 W. N. 0. 673, both verify this statement. In Ferrance's Appeal, 107 Pa. Stat.
ceptant.
180, it is expressly stated by the court
1. Deed of assignmentworked a conver(Paxson, J.) that the advantage of a judgsion, and revivals of judgments are only
ment creditor could be retained by a rerequired to preserve lien on lands.
2. It is not necessary to revive a judg- vival of the judgment, and in no other
ment in order to maintain its lien on
way. It is there said that the assignment
money in the assignee's hands. Com. v.
for the benefit of creditors does not obviate
Gleim, 3 R. & W. 417.
the necessity of the revival of the judg3. Voluntary assignment of re can
not affect liens created against assignor.
nient, and that to so decide would be in
Sheaffer's Appeal, 101 Pa. 45.
direct contravention of the Act of 1798.
MITCHELL and KERN for other creditors.
Therefore, since Burley has been negli1. The judgment not being revived, the
in not conforming with the requiregent
lien was lost, and distribution should be
ments of the Act of Assembly, he has lost
pro rata. Act April 4, 1798, 1 P. & L.
2471; Snively's Estate, 9 0. C. 422; Stirk's
his privilege as a judgmenzt creditor, and
App., 2 W. N. 0. 673; Fulton's Est., 51
is only entitled to share with the general
Pa. 204.
creditors in the proceeds of the sale of
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Waring's lands. Further comment is
unnecessary.
Joseph Burley, the exceptant in this
The report of the auditor is therefore
case, seeks to have his claim against the
and his award relegating Bursustained,
estate of Robert Waring paid in full in
of the general creditors
position
to
the
ley
preference to the other creditors. He conaffirmed.
tends that his having obtained a judgment
HARPEL, J.

MOOT COURT.

against Waring privileges his claim as
against the other creditors, and that they
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JNO. M. CURTIN vs. JNO. B. LUCAS.
Trespass in slander.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John M. Curtin brought an action of
slander against John B. Lucas, and filed
his statement. The defendant, not having entered the plea of "not guilty" fifteen days after the return day, plaintiff's
attorney made a motion in open court
that the prothonotary be directed to enter
the plea of the general issue. The motion
was allowed. Subsequently, under a rule
of court, which reads as follows: "When
a general or short plea is entered, or any
plea not specifically stating the items of
defense, in any action whatever the plaintiffmay enter a rule in the Rule Book on
the defendant to file a bill of particulars
of his defense, and on failure to comply
with such rule for twenty days after service thereof, no evidence shall be admitted of fraud, want of consideration,
particular payments, set-off, defalcation
or other special matters of defense,"
plaintiff ruled defendant to file a bill of
particulars of his defense.
Defendant's attorney then presented a
petition asking that a rule be granted on
plaintiff to show cause why the rule to
file a bill of particulars should not be
stricken off. It was granted, and, on argument, defendant's attorney presented
the following points why the rule to
strike off should be made absolute: (1)
The case is not at issue, as no legal plea
has been entered; for slander was not contemplated by the Act of 25th May, 1887
(Procedure Act), and the defendant should
be ruled to plead. (2) Even if the case is
at issue, and notwithstanding the rule of
court, above cited, the rule to file a bill of
particulars is not permissible under the
plea of the general issue, but is only allowable under the short pleas, payment,
set-off, and statute of limitations.
The court dischargcd defendant's rule,
and, after final judgment, the defendant
appealed, alleging for error, inter alia,the
order of the court in discharging the above
rule.
TRUDE and TURNE_ for appellant.
1. Rule of court is not applicable to actions ex-delicto. Act May 25,1887.
2. Slander was not covered by above

act.

It should be liberally construed.

124Pa. 363.
3. Rule to file a bill of particulars is not
permissible under plea of general issue.
POINTS and STERRETT for appellee.
1. Slander was contemplated by Act of
May 25, 1887. McLenaban v. Andrews,
135 Pa. 383; Press Co. v. Stewart. 119 Pa.
584; Church v. Light, 7 Sup. Ct. 223.
2. Rule of court is enforceable. Snyder
v. Buchanan, 8 S. & R. 336; Linderman
v. Land Co., 15 W. N. C. 192.
OPINION OF THE COUIT.
The contentions as set forth by defendant are: First, "The case is not at issue,
as no legal plea has been entered; for
slander was not contemplated by the Act
25th May, 1887 (Procedure Act), and the
defendant should be ruled to plead." Second, "Even if the case is at issue, and
notwithstanding the rule of court above
cited, the rule to file a bill of particulars
is not permissible under the plea of the
general issue, but is only allowable under
the short pleas, payment, set-off, and
statute of limitations."
As to the first contention, we think that
there is not one scintilla of doubt but that
slander is contemplated by the Act of May
25, 1887. Sundstrom v. Schofield, 21 W.
N. C. 541. The action of trespass is wide
and comprehensive, and by the Act of
1887 includes such actions as trover, trespass and trespass on the case, which were
heretofore maintainable separately. Slander, though maintainable as a separate
action before the passage of the Act of
1887, and may be yet, is a species of trespass meaning nothing more than an action
of trespass on the case. When an action
was brought for slander it was in trespass
on the case. The combination of the action of trespass on the case, together with
other actions ex-delicto, into one form of
action, called an "action of trespass,"
necessarily includes slander. The absurdity of the situation would be most
manifest to say that the action for slander
could be brought in any other action than
that of an action ex-delicto.
By an examination of the late decisions
we find that actions for slander are designated as "trespass for slander." Thompson v. M Cready, 194 Pa. 32; McGaw v.
Hamilton, 184 Pa. 108. Slander being
contemplated by the Act of 1887, the plea
of the general issue was the proper plea.

THE FORUM.
The plaintiff's second contention is:
That the rule to file a bill of particulars is
not permissible under the pleas of the general issue, but is only allowable under the
short pleas, payment, set-off, and statute
of limitations. We think the following
rule of court decides this point : "Where
a general or short plea is entered, or any
plea not specifically stating the items of
defense, in any action whatever, the plaintiff may enter a rule in the Rule Book on
the defendant to file a bill of particulars
of his defense, and on failure to comply
with such rule for twenty days after service thereof, no evidence shall be admitted
of fraud, want of consideration, particular
payments, set-off, defalcation, or other
special matters of defense." It was ruled
in Snyder et at. v. Bauchman et al., 8 S.
& R. 336, that "all courts of record have a
right to make rules for the regulation of
their practice, not in violation of the law
of the land ; and they are the most proper
judges of the extent and application of
their own rules." The ruling in Organ
Co. v. Echer, 184 Pa. 350, gives the court
power to make rules for the regulation of
its practice, not in violation of the laws of
the land. A non-suit will be granted for
failure to file a bill of particulars within
the time required by the rules of court.
Linderman v. Land Co., 15 W. N. C. 192.
The Act of 1887 provides that "the pleadings in all courts to be subject to the rules
of the respective courts as to notice of
special matter." We think that the court
had the right to discharge the rule.
HOWARD L. HENDERSON, J.
DRISCHMAN vs. McMANEMIN.
Reformation of leasefor mistake.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mary M. Drischman rented a house belonging to Sarah E. McManemin for the
period of one year, by a lease under seal.
Through the fault of the real estate
agent who drew up the lease the party of
the first part was named John C. McManemin. He is the son of Sarah E. McManemin, the owner of the house, and was
authorized by her to sign the lease.
His signature to the lease is as follows:
"John C. McManemin, Agent."

Suit is brought for a breach of one of the
covenants in the lease. The defendant
filed a demurrer to the declaration, claiming that the lease showed no responsibility
on part of the owner, and that eviderce
could not be introduced to show that John
McManemin signed as agent for his
mother, acting under her express direction.
The case comes up for argument on the
demurrer. Can the demurrer be sustained ?
BROCK and MOON for plaintiff.
1. Demurrer cannot be sustained. The
court has power to correct the mistake of
the scrivener. Andrews v. Gillespie, 47
N. Y. 487; 102 Pa. 17; 141 Pa. 389.
NICHOLLS and OSBORNE for defendant.
1. The plaintiff held under the agent as
landlord, and not under the defendant.
Seyfert v. Bean, 83 Pa. 450; Heflerman v.
Addams, 7 W. 116; Schaefer v. Hinkle, 75
N. Y. 378.
2. The agent's authority to make the
lease was not in writing, as is required by
the Statute of Frauds. Twitchell v. City
of Phila., 33 Pa. 212; Nicholson v. Mifflin,
2 Yeates 38.
3. The plaintiff, as tenant, cannot dispute the title of the agent, his landlord.
Holt v. Martin, 51 Pa. 503,
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There is nothing upon the face of the
lease to indicate that Sarah E. McManemin was in any way connected or interested in the lease. Her name does not appear in it. Neither did she sign it herself.
Apparently, the covenants in the lease
are solely between the plaintiff and John
C. McManemim. And where an agent,
without disclosing his principal, executes
a lease of a house in his own name, the
tenant holds under the agent. The relation of landlord and tenant is exclusively
between them, and upon any breach of
the lessor's covenants the action will lie
against the agent, and no other. It makes
no difference that the agent in signing the
lease wrote the word "agent " after his
name. The authorities on this point are
explicit and direct. Seyfert v. Bean, 83
Pa. 450; Holt v. Martin, 51 Pa. 503.
But the defendant's pleading admits
that the lease was not reduced to writing
conformable to the intention of the parties. Sarah E. McManemin, the real
owner and lessor of the house, was the
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person intended as party to the first part
of the lease. She was not an undisclosed
principal, nor a disclosed, unnamed principal. It was not her intention that the
lease should be executed in the name of
her agent. It was through the fault of
the scrivener that John C. McManemin
was named as lessor. We think that
Sarah E. McManemin is responsible for
the breach of the covenant of the lease,
and if tha lease shows no responsibility on
her part, we see no reason why the inadvertence of the scrivener in inserting the
wrong name cannot be shown here. Correcting the mistake now will not contradict, vary, add to or disturb any part of
the lease as was intended to operate between the parties. If the English rule,
that parol evidenceis inadmissible to varY
the legal operation of an instrument, were
the law of this state, we would be obliged
to sustain the demurrer in this case. But
we have drifted far away from that rule.
It is the well-settled law of this state that
the mistake of the scrivener, in preparing
a deed or other writing, may be shown by
parol evidence, and the instrument reformed accordingly. This is but an exercise of the equity powers inherent in all of
our courts. Parol evidence has been received to supply deficiencies in a written
instrument, to explain ambiguities in the
subject matter of writings, to prevent
frauds, and to correct mistakes. A deed
absolute on its face has been proved a
mortgage by parol evidence. Hamilton v.
Asslin, 14 S. & R. 450; Huss v. Morris, 63
Pa. 372; Gower v. Sterner, 2 Wharton 78;
Chalfant v. Williams, 35 Pa. 215.
Again, it is contended by the defendant
that evidence cannot be introduced to
show that John C. McManemin acted as
agent under the express direction of his
mother.
We are of the opinion that, as the case
is before us, we ought to presume that,
when one undertook to act as agent, and
did so act, he was duly authorized.
The demurrer is overruled and the defendant directed to plead.
By the court.
JASPER ALEXANDER,

J.

OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The landlord's covenant for quiet enjoyment having been broken, Mrs. Drisch-

man brings this action of assumpsit upon
it. The declaration sets out alease by John
C. McManemin to her, which is signed by
"John C. McManemin, Agent." The
lease is for the period of one year, and is
under the seal of John C. McManemin.
The declaration also alleges that McManemin was acting as the agent for his
mother, the owner; that it was the intention of the parties that the mother's name
should be used as that of the lessor in the
instrument, but that by the fault of the
scrivener the name of the son was written
instead. Mrs. McManemin demurs to the
declaration as disclosing no cause of action
against her.
Possibly, if no mistake had been made
by the scrivener, the parties .would. have
been precluded from alleging that the relation of landlord and tenant had grown
up between Mrs. Drischman and Mrs.
MeManemin. The use of the word~agent
would possibly not have established such
a relation, although John C. was in fact
acting as agent for the latter. Such seems
to be the doctrine of Seyfert v. Bean, 83
Pa. 450, where the right of the owner to
distrain for rent was denied; and of Holt
v. Martin, 51 Pa. 499, where the owner of
one-seventh, acting for himself and for the
owners of the other six-sevenths, after
making a lease, in his own name as
"agent" and then selling his one-seventh,
was permitted, in conformity with the
terms of the lease, to recover possession by
ejectment, although some of the co-tenants had revoked his agency. In those
cases, however, it was not intended by the
parties that the names of the owners
should appear in the lease as the party of
the first part. The lease adequately expressed the purpose of the parties.
The demurrer practically challenges the
right of the plaintiff to prove the mistake
of the scrivener. Reformation of instruments for fraud, accident or mistake is one
of the familiar heads of equity jurisdiction, and in Pennsylvania this reformation
can be effected in a common law action
upon the instrument. We cannot know,
at this stage of the case, what evidence is
in the power of the plaintiff; nor whether
it will prove sufficient to justify the rectification of the instrument. The omission
to state fully what facts are to be proved,
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and by what witnesses, is no demurrable
defect.
It is objected that it is not suggested by
the declaration that the authority of John
C. MceManemin to sign the lease was in
writing, and that, if it was not, the defendant was not bound by his execution
of the lease. The Statute of Frauds does
not require leases for one year to be in
writing. Cf. Jennings v. McComb, 112
Pa. 518. An oral lease, made directly by
Mrs. MceManemin, would have been valid.
A written or oral lease made for her by
her son, under an oral authority, is therefore not invalid.
The instrument is sealed; and there are
cases that hold that the authority of an
agent to execute a deed must be conferred
by deed-Gordon v. Bulkley, 14 S. & R.
331; but at present the only effect of the
absence of a seal to the power of attorney
would be to make the seal used by the
agent void, and not the contract itself.
Baum v. Dubois, 43 Pa. 260. It does not
appear that Mrs. McManemin authorized
the agent to affix the seal, nor was the seal
at all necessary to the validity of thelease.
Another objection made by the learned
counsel for the appellant to the judgment
below is, that it impliedly allows a tenant
to dispute the title of his landlord. It is
a principle of the law, that when a tenant
obtains possession of land under a lease he
is estopped from retainingitas against the
lessor, on the ground that the lessor's title
wasdefective. Had this action been ejectment by John C. McMenamin to recover
the possession from Mary M. Drischman,
she might have been precluded from denying his right to the land, although this is
by no means clear. There is no room for
the estoppel in an action by the lessee
against the admittedly r~al owner for a
breach of eovenant.
Were we satisfied, however, that the
court below had committed an error in
overruling the demurrer and ordering the
defendant to plead, we should nevertheless be compelled to dismiss this appeal.
Appeals lie, in general, only from the final
judgments or decrees of the lower courts.
This judgment on the demurrer is but interlocutory. After the trial, and final
judgment, an appeal can be taken, on
which we shall be able to consider all the

errors which the court may have committed.
Judgment affirmed.

SMITH'S APPEAL.
Auditor's report-feeanics'lien-Bond
-Agreement to sell premises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Williamson contracted to sell a lot for
$1,000 to Hatter, who paid $50 and gave
his bond for $950, payable in one year.
Hatter caused a house to be erected on the
lot, from which liens of mechanics arose.
Smith had a lien for $230, and other materialmen, to the extent of $2,400. Williamson sued on the bond a year after the
house was finished, got judgment, and
caused a sale of the premises. The proceeds were $2,200. The auditor and court
decided that Williamson sold only his
right to collect the $950, and that after
paying this sum to him the residue belonged to Hatter. The mechanics' lien
creditors contended that the sale was of
the whole interest, the vendor and the
vendee's, and that they should be paid in
full before Williamson, because theirliens
were earlier.
NICHOLLS and TURNER for appellant.
1. There was error in giving priority to
claim of Williamson. Bond was personal
obligation only. Welsh v. Murry, 4 Dall.
320; Welsh v. Murray, 4 Yeates 197. Judgment was sued out subsequent to completion of building.
2. Where vendor, under articles to convey, sells the land under a judgment for
unpaid purchase money, he possesses entire title. Horbach v. Riley, 7 Pa. 81;
Zeigler's Appeal, 69 Pa. 461; Cannon v.
Campbell, 34 Pa. 311.
KATZ and RHODES for appellee.
1. The lien covered only estate of vendee. 36 Pa. 247; 1 Grant 233 ; Act April
20, 1840, 2 P. & L. 928.
2. The vendee had only ani equitable
title. 106 Mass. 228.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In this appeal two assignments of error
are alleged.
First. That the lower court erred in decreeing that Williamson, the holder of the
legal title, was entitled to priority over
Smith, a mechanics' lien creditor, in the
distribution of the proceeds arising from
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an execution sale of the premises by Williamson.
Second. Granting that Williamson had
priority, the court erred in allowing the
surplus to be turned over to Hatter, and
in saying that "Williamson sold only his
right to collect the $950."
The first assignment of error, we think,
cannot besustained. In Nierheller's Appeal, 24 Pa. 105, it was laid down that
where a vendor obtains a judgment for the
purchase money and sells the land by
means of a process issued upon it, that he
must be considered as selling all that
estate in the land, which he agreed to sell
and convey to the vendee. The interest
thus sold must have been the whole legal
and equitable estate, and it therefore follows that the vendor was entitled to
priority of payment because of his paramount title as owner of the land. Whether
the &uppoedlien of the vendor's judgment was prior or subsequent to other
judgments is immaterial. To the same
effect are Day v. Lowrie, 5 Watts 412, and
Love v. Jones, 4 Watts 465.
As to the second assignment, we think
the court below erred in its rulings. We
think that it is a well established doctrine
in Pennsylvania that where a vendor,
under articles to convey, sells the land
under a judgment for the unpaid purchase
money, he passes both the estate of his
vendee and his own legal title. Cannon
v. Campbell, 34 Pa. 311; Zeigler's Appeal,
69 Pa. 471 ; Nierheller's Appeal, 24 Pa.
105; Act of June 16, 1836, P. & L. 2001.
It necessarily follows that the court
erred in charging that Williamson sold
only his right to collect the $950, and in
turning over the proceeds to Hatter.
Judgment reversed as to second assignment of error, and it is decreed that the
claims of lien creditors must be satisfied
before Hatter is entitled to surplus.
W. H. TAYLOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPRE

COURT.

At the earnest solicitation of counsel the
case has been reheard, and it becomes our
duty to announce the result rendered by us.
Williamson contracted to sell a lot for
$1,000 to Hatter, who paid $50 and gave
his bond for $950, payable in one year.
Hatter took possession of the premises,

and caused a house to be erected on it.
From this construction of the house mechanics' liens arose. One of the questions
involved is, To what did these liens attach ?
The contract between Williamson and
Hatter divided what had been the unitary
interest of Williamson into two: a right
in Hatter of possession, control and disposition, such as an owner ordinarily has,
and a right in Williamson to coerce payment of the unpaid purchase money, or,
in default of that, to repossess himself of
the premises and extinguish the right of
Hatter. For many purposes, Hatter became an owner. Imp. F. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460; Siter's Appeal, 26 Pa.
180; Millville Mut. Co. v. Wilgus, 88 Pa.
107. As such he could erect buildings and
create mechanics' liens, but these liens
would attach, not to the interest of the
vendor, Williamson, but to that of the
vendee only. 3 Liens31.
Williamson had a species of lien arising
by the contract, and continuing until he
should make a conveyance. As he did
not make a conveyance, this lien Vas not
lost at any time prior to the sheriff's sale.
It is true that the judgment upon the bond
was not obtained until a year after completion of the house, but as it was for the
unpaid purchase money, and as this
money was a lien from the date of the
contract, the lien of the judgment would
relate back to the date of the contract. 1
Liens 215. It would follow that if the sale
on Williamson's judgment divested the
estate of Hatter, both its lien and those of
the mechanics would be divested, and the
judgment being first paid, the mechanics'
liens would be entitled to the residue of
the fund.
The view of the learned courtbelow was
somewhat peculiar. Following the auditor,
it held that Williamson "sold only his
right to collect the $50."
It would, indeed, be singular if a creditor levied his
debt out of his own estate and not out of
that of his debtor, and still more singular
if anyone would pay $2,200 for the rightto
collect $950. What he sells is never his
own right, but the right of the debtor.
It is true that by selling he exercises, and
ipsofacto exhausts, his right to sell, but
this phenomenon can with no propriety
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be described as a sale of his right to collect
his debt. What Williamson sold was the
entire interest of Hatter. The only question that could be debated would be
whether this sale would discharge the lien
for the purchase money. That lien was
first in rank. The sale was upon it. The
object of such sale was to obtain payment
of the lien on which it proceeded. The
principle is, in the absence of statutory
direction to the contrary, universal, that
any lien on which a sale takes place is discharged by that sale, whether the purchase money realized will be enough to
pay it or not. The sale on Williamson's
judgment, which was for the purchase
money, discharged the lien for the purchase money. 1 Liens 215; Zeigler's Appe.l, 69 Pa. 47i.
It follows from what has been said that
Williamson was properly paid from the
proceeds of the sale, and that what remained df them ought to have been paid
over to the mechanics, if their alleged lien
was valid. The history of the case shows
that liens arose, and avers that Smith had
one for $230, and that other materialmen
had others, all the liens aggregating $2,400.
It is perhaps unfortunate that it does not
more explicitly appear what steps, if any,
were taken to maintain these liens. Before the auditor, and in the court below,
their validity was not attacked, but the
refusal to allow them to participate in the
distribution was founded on the theory
that Williamson sold only his right to collect the $950. We think our former judgment, which the opinion of our brother,
Taylor, accompanies, was correct.
LEWIS vs. WELSH.
Deceit-Defendant'sknowledge of falsity
-P-Plaintiff's right to rely on defendant's
representation where there is opportunity to inspect.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Lewis and Welsh were negotiating for
the sale of a stock of shoes in Welsh's
store. Welsh said that the stock was
worth $1,000; that he paid $1,200 for it,
and that every shoe was in good condition.
Lewis was a shoe dealer, but was very
busy at the time and told Welsh that he

hadn't time to inspect the stock carefully,
but would rely on Welsh's representation.
After taking the stock be (Lewis) found
that many of the shoes had been more or
less damaged by a fire and that the stock
was worth only $500.
He therefore brings this action for deceit.
HELRIEGEL and JONES for plaintiff.
1. The representation was made with
knowledge of its falsity and all of the
other elements of deceit are present.
Bower v. Fenn, 90 Pa. 362; Cox v. Higley,
100 Pa. 252; Fisher v. Worrall, 5 W. & S.
2. Plaintiff had a right to rely on defendant's representation without inspecting the stock. Salem Rubber Co. v.
Adams, 23 Pick. 256; Pentecost v. Godfrey, 23 Pitts, L. J. 177; R. R. Co. v.
Tyng, 63 N. Y. 653.
LAMBERT and KEELOR for defendants.
1. Plaintiff has no cause for action if,
having ample opportunity to inspect the
goods, he relied upon the statements of
the seller concerning their value. Rocksfellow v. Baker, 41 Pa. 319; Clark v.
Everhart, 63 Pa. 347; Slaughter v. Gerson,
80 U. S. 379; Whetherill v. Neilson, 20
Pa. 448; Shisler v. Baxter, 109 Pa. 443.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In an action for deceit it is necessary
not only to show a misrepresentation, that
it was made for the purpose of having the
party to whom it was made act upon it,
that the party acted upon it to his damage
and in ignorance of its untruth, but that
the party making the representation knew
it was false. In Cox v. Higley, 100 Pa. 252,
the court said: "As one of the questions
relate to the defendant's good faith, if the
jury believed that he honestly believed
what he stated to be true, this action
would fail; for in such case the representation was not fraudulent."
Counsel for the plaintiff cited Bower v.
Fenn, 90 Pa. 359, in which the court permitted Fenn, when sued on a contract for
the purchase money, to reduce the sum to
the extent of the damages which he sustained, on the ground that the value of the
drug store was misrepresented, and despite the fact that Bower believed that the
representation he made was true.
The judge in this case in his opinion
referred to Fisher v. Worrall, 5 W. & S. 478,
in which C. J. Gibson held a misrepresentation of an occult quality in land, though
it may have been made In ignorance of
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the truth, sufficient to defeat a recovery.
ut Fisher v. Worrall was an action of
covenant which is in the nature of an
action for specific performance and the
court in deciding it applied equitable
principles.
Bower v. Fenn resembled
Fisher v. Worrall, in that both were actions for purchase money. But the base
at hand is entirely different. It is an
action of deceit, and belief that the misrepresentation was true is a valid defense.
100 Pa. 252.
The question then is, " Did Welsh believe the representation was true?" This
is a question of fact for the jury and not a
question of law for the court. The ease is
remanded to the court for a trial de novo.
JOHN KEMP, J.
JOHN SELDEN vs. WM. RANSOM
ET AL.
Partnership liabilitly.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A, B and C being partners. Ransom
bought out A's interest, and the business
was continued by him, B and C. Ransom put his son Charles in the store and
agreed to let Charles have, as compensation, his share of the profits. Selden made
sales of goods to the firm from time to
time. Subsequently Ransom bought out
B and C and turned over the whole business to his son, presenting him with the
property. Charles continued in the store,
apparently managing the business as before. Selden continued to make sales.
This action is for the price of articles
soldafter Win. Ransom had transferred his
property to Charles. Selden had no notice
of the changes of the composition of the
firm. He sued Win. Ransom, Charles
Ransom, B and C.
DONAHOE and HICKERNELL for plaintiff.
1. A retiring partner, to absolve himself from liability to parties who haye had
dealings with the firm, must give such
parties actual notice. Little v. Ciark, 36
Pa. 114; Bratzman v. Newcomet. 69 Pa.
185; Watkinson v. Banl4, 4 Whart. 482.
2. One who shares in profits is, in Pennsylvania, a partner as to third parties.
Purviance v. McClintee, 6 S. & R. 259;
Irwin v. Bidwell, 72 Pa. 244; Wessels v.
Weiss, 166 Pa. 490.

COOPER and HOAGLAND for defendant.

1. Sharing of profits does not necessarily
constitute one a partner. Miller v. Bartlett, 15 S. & R. 137.
2. There was sufficient here of dissolution to relieve the old partners. Davis v.
Keyes, 38 N. Y. 94; Coddington v. Hunt,
6 Hill (N. Y.) 595; 3 Kent's Comm. 68.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
iswhetherWm. Ransom, B, C and Charles
Ransom are liable for the price of goods
sold to Chas. Ransom.
Win. Ransom, B and C were members
of the firm at onetime. Charles Ransom,
son of William, conducted thebusinessfor
his father and received his father's share
of the profits. Win. Ransom subsequently
bought out the interest of B and C and
presented his son with the property and
turned over the whole business to him.
It is.for the goods sold to the house after
the transfer that this action is brought.
Selden also made sales to the old firm of
Win. Ransom, B and C.
The case at bar is not entirely anew one,
as it has been partly decided in Newcomet
v. Bratzman, 69 Pa. 185, of which the
facts in brief, are as follows: Samuel
Newcomet bought out another member of
a firm and placed his son in the store to
conduct the business for him, giving him
his share of the profits. Subsequently S.
INewcomet bought out the other members
of the firm and gave the whole business to
his son, and plaintiff continued to supply
goods to house as before until account had
accumulated, and he now brings an action
against S. Newcomet for the amount of
goods supplied. Judge Agnew, in deciding
this case, said, "that the principle involved is not the ordinary one of dissolution of partnership, but rests ratherunder
the doctrine of estoppel, as here the person
with whom he dealt was not a partner,
and in that respect it cannot be said that
the authority which a member has to bind
his partner is brought into play, and
therefore it cannot be said he was apparently acting for the firm. Hence, S.
Newcomet must be equitably estopped
from setting up sale or gift of store."
Now, as John Selden has dealt with the
original firm of Win. Ransom, B and C,
he could not, without being informed, distinguish between the business done before
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the gift and afterwards. The creditors of
the firm did not, and could not, know of a
different membership in the firm. They
lent their credft to the house supposing
that they were selling goods to the original firm, for they had no notice to the contrary. It was Win. Ransom, B and C's
plain duty to give notice to each creditor
who hid previously dealt with the firm, to
notify each one actually as to their withdrawing from the firm, if they would cast
off responsibility from themselves. Their
silence would naturally mislead, and as
the law has laid down a method by which
one can withdraw from a firm or partnership, and thereby exempt himself from
liability as to subsequent debts, and the
withdrawing members failed or neglected
to use it they must suffer the consequences,
and are thereby liable for the goods sold to
Chas. Ransom. For the law has been laid
down from the early days of this century
down to the present day that, on the dissolution of a partnership, the retiring
member$ of the firm must give actual notice to all persons who have previously
dealt with the firm of their withdrawal,
and constructive notice as to others.
We must hold Charles Ransom liable
for the goods sold on the ground that he
was the actual member of the house, receiving the profits and being benefited
generally by his pursuit of the business,
and therefore he should be held responsible for any liabilities which were incurred
while he was receiving the profits from
the business.
L. L. FRA'wN, J.
REBECCA JAMES'S APPEAL.
Waiver of dower rights during coverture.

James, being cognizant of the contents of
my husband's will, and desiring that it
may take effect as such, hereby agree to
its provisions for me and renounce all my
rights under the intestate laws."
The two witnesses to the will also subscribed this paper as witnesses. The will
was then duly executed and the two papers
attached and put in testator's safe.
After his death the will was duly probated and the paper filed by the executor
in the Orphans' Court. The widow received from the executor the personal
gifts and continued to reside in the house.
Before the auditor making distribution
of the personalty, nine months after the
husband's death, she claimed one-half of
the fund, the husband leaving no lineal
next of kin. She furnished evidence that
she did not realize the magnitude of the
estate when she signed the paper.
The auditor, without deciding whether
she knew it or not, held her bound by the
agreement and the Orphans' Court affirmed his report.
MINNICH and KENNEDY for appellant.
Election of woman during coverture is
not binding upon her. Kreiser's Appeal,
69 Pa. 195; Toomey's Estate, 2 W. N. C.
682; Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. 298.
Election is not binding unless made with
full knowledge of character of the estate.
Duncan v. Duncan, 2 Yeates 302.
The widow has twelve months in which
to elect. Act Mar. 29, 1832; 1 P. & L. 1680.
CLARK and KLINE, DAN, for appellee.

An agreement between husband and
wife as to the disposition of their respective
estates at death is binding. Dillinger's
Appeal, 35 Pa. .57; Scott's Estate, 147 Pa.
1O, ;Hitner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110.
The principle adopted in Kreiser's Appeal (69 Pa. 194) is founded on a common
law theory of the marital relations. Under
the Acts of 1848, 1887 and 1893 the case is
not binding as a precedent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

John James, Aug. 11, 1899, wrote a will,
in which he gave to his wife certain stocks,
debts due him, household furniture, and
a life estate in the house in which he lived.
The personalty thus given to her was
about one-fourth of all the personalty.
Besides the house he had three others
worth four times as much as the house.
The wife was consulted about thewill, and
after it was written, but before signing,
she subscribed this paper, "I, Rebecca

This is an action by the widow of John
James for her dower rights in his property. John James made a will in which
he bequeathed and devised certain real
and personal property to his widow. Before the ,vill of James was executed, he
succeeded in persuading his wife to sign a
paper, acknowledging and releasing all
her rights under the intestate laws. The
will was then executed"and together with
the wife's renunciation deposited in the
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testator's safe. After his death the will

cery would leave the other parties in interest to their remedy at law."
The case just cited is stronger than the
one before us for adjudication. The inequality of the several shares was slight
compared with those in the case before us,
the widow getting only about one-fourth
of what she was really entitled to under
the intestate law. Then again, the widow
here was not fully aware of the magnitude
of the estate, while in the case just cited
the widow was well informed as to the
amount of property. James was evidently
endeavoring to defraud his wife, and that
was the reason he procured her signature
to the above mentioned paper. It was
certainly for no good purpose that he had
her sign the renunciation.
The widow has a year within which to
make her election; Act of March 29, 1832;
P. & L. 1679.
The defendants claim that the widow
may make contracts as if she was unmarried, in writing or otherwise, under the
Act of June 8, 1893. Of this we certainly
Now, know ye that I do hereby ratify and
have no doubt, but when she and her husaccept of the provisions contained in said
band are the contracting parties, the court
will in lieu of my dower or right at com- will look upon the contract with a jealous
mon law, &c. Hereby renouncing all eye, and if not to the benefit of the wife,
clainis and suits for dower in said estate or at least beneficial to both in an equal
which I might in common law, &c., be degree, it will be declared void. The act
entitled." When the appraisement of the did not destroy the legal unity of husband
personalty was made and set aside to her, and wife at common law; Bramberry's
she did not evidence her desire to claim
Estate, 156 Pa. 628.
under the intestate law. Eight days after
The decedent hhd no children; therefore
this property was set aside to her, but the widow is entitled to one-half the perwithin a year after the death of her hus- sonalty absolutely, and one-half the realty
band, she gave notice that she claimed
for life.
under the intestate law. Pearson, P. J.
The judgment of the Orphans' Court is
said: "The first question presented to the therefore reversed, costs to be paid out of
court relates to the validity and binding
the estate and distribution to be made aceffect of this writing. It is clearly void at cording to this opinion.
law, and cannot be sustained as a legal
JAs: N. LIGHTNER, J.
was probated and the agreement filed by
the executors in the Orphans' Court.
About nine months after the probate and
when the funds were ready for distribution, the widow appeared before the auditor and demanded one-half the funds at his
disposal, stating that she would not abide
by the will and claiming underthe intestate
laws. She furnished evidence to show
that she was not aware of the magnitude
of the estate when she executed the above
mentioned paper. The auditor, without
deciding whether she knew or not, held
her bound by the agreement and the Orphans' Court affirmed his report.
This case is ruled by Kreiser's Appeal,
69 Pa. 194, and cases there cited. The
widow in that case being fully cognizant of the husband's estate, signed an
a-greement in the following language:"Know ye all men, that I, Elizabeth
Kreiser. was fully acquainted with the
contents of the foregoing will and testanient by my said husband, Jacob Kreiser.

instrument against a feme covert. ** * **

She had no one with whom to contract;
not with her husband, for they are, legally speaking, one person; besides, she is
presumed to be under his control and
coercion. * ** * * She could always be con-

trolled by love or fear, overawed by threats,
or cajoled by promises. * r- * **

Besides, if

there was any inequality equity would not
bind her. ]Being under legal disability, the
bargain must be clearly for her benefitat least not to her disadvantage, or chan-

HUSTON vs. STERIRETT.
Sheriff's sale-Inducing bystanders to refrain from bidding-Agreementof third
party to pTurchaseforjudgmentdebtor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sterrett was indebted, and his land was
advertised to be sold by the sheriff, on an
execution. Sterrett asked Houston to buy
in the land for him and Houston agreed
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to do so. It was dgreed between them,
that they should both cause bystanders at
the sale, to-know that Huston was bidding for Sterrett. They did so, and other
bidders refrained from bidding. Huston
being the second bidder, and his bid, which
was S1OO, exceeding by $100 that of the
first bidder. The land was knocked down
to him, and the sheriff's deed made to him.
He thereupon repudiated his agreement
to buy for Sterrett, and though Sterrett
was ready to pay and offered to pay him
what he bid and interest, he brought this
ejectment.
CRARY and AfoQx for plaintiffi
Where a person buys for another at a
sheriff's sale, but with his own money, no
resulting trust is created.-Carhart's Ap-

peal, 78 Pa. 100; Sample v. Coulson, 9 W.
& S. 62.

A mere breach of parol agreement will
not make the purchaser a trustee.-Jackman v. Ringland, 4 W. & S. 150. Kimmell
v. Smith, 117 Pa. 183.
Proof of fraud must be clear, precise and
indubitable.- Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. 279;
MfeGinity v. McGinity, 63 Pa. 38.
PoINTrs and CLAYCOMB for defendant.
The purchaser became a trustee ex maleficio.-Cook v. Cook, 69 Pa. 443; Heath's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 1; Christy v. Sill, P'5 Pa.
387; Kraft v. Smith, 117 Pa. 183; Kennedy
v. McCloskey, 170 Pa. 354; Boynton v.
Houster, 73 Pa. 453.
OPINION OF THE COU,'M

The contention in this case arose upon a
parol agreement between Win. Sterrett
and Samuel Huston. The former was indebted and agreed with the latter, that he
should purchase the land at sheriff's sale
which was advertised. They had agreed
to cause bystanders to know that Huston
was buying for the execution debtor, which
they did and the bidders refrained from
bidding.
There were two bids, Huston
being second bidder, his bid being $3100 or
$100 in advance of the other bidder. The
sheriff knocked it down to him at that
price and deeded the ground to him. He
thereupon repudiated the agreement with
Sterrett although Sterrett offered him the
price paid with interest paid at the time.
This action ofejectment is brought. What
interest did Huston take in the land under
the foregoing conditions?
If his actions were not tainted with
fraud, his title is good and recovery ofpossession should be permitted as a mere

breach of the parol agreement would not
convert the purchaser into a trustee, Jackson v. Ringland, 4 W. & S. 149.
The mere "causing the bidders to know"
for whom Huston was bidding, was not
in itself sufficient to create fraud, for the
natural tendency of man is selfish and his
interests alone concern him. Where opportunity confronts him he takes advantage of it, unless his sympathy for his
neighbor causes him to refrain as in this
case.
With these two elements present "The
causing bystanders to know for whom he
was bidding" and "theirrefraining to bid,"
can fraud be attributed to the plaintiff? I
think not. But, does his subsequent repudiation of hisagreement alter the effect?
I think it does in especially if the proceeds
of sheriff's sale are less than the property is
actually worth. In such ease the plaintiff
has defrauded the execution debtor, and
the courts will not countenance his title.
"Equity will not permit one to hold a
benefit which he has derived through
fraud even of another, and much less will
it do so, if he has acquired it by his own
fraud." Sheriff v. Neal, 6 Watts 541.
"It is equally well settled that if one be
induced to confide in the promise of another, that he will so purchase for one or
both and is thus led to do what otherwise
he would have forborne, or to forbear what
he contemplated to do, in the acquisition
of an estate, whereby the promissor becomes the holder of the legal title, an attempted denial of the confidence in such a
fraud as will operate to convert the purchaser into a trustee ex maleficio. AMorey
v. Herrick, 6 Harris 128: Beagle v. Wentz,
5P.F S. 369.
This case is practically ruled by Cook v.
Cook, 69 Pa. 443, inasmuch as the facts are
analagous, though in that case evidence
was introduced to show that the property
sold below cost and that there were those
present who would have bid more, while
in Huston v. Sterrett the following points
lead mne to the same conclusion.
First, the fact that there were but two
bids, I think, is sufficient to justify the
conclusion that some persons present did
not bid who intended to bid by reason of
the influence brought to bear upon them
by the representations of the plaintiff.
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Secondly, Sterrett's offer to pay the
principle and interest, justifies the conclusion that the property was worth more
than it brought, at the sheriffs sale, to
him at least.
The court upon these conclusions, instructs the jury that the satne conditions
and circumstances exist in this cdse as in
Cook v. Cook, supra, and therefore Huston became a trustee ex maleficio.
DEAL, J.
OPINION OF SUPREMIE COURT.

Huston became the purchaser of the
premises in question at a sherifPs sale.
He did not contract to lend the money to
Sterrett and with the money thus lent to
buy as mere agent for Sterrett. Tile relation of lender and borrower, of creditor
and debtor did not arise. Jackman v.
Ringland, 4 W. & S. 150; Kimmel v.
Smith, 117 Pa. 183.
If, the sherif's deed being made to Huston, he did not become the beneficial
owner, this result must follow from the
facts attending the purchase. These facts
are, or, possibly might by the jury be inferred to be (1) A promise by Huston to
purchase the land, and to convey it back
to Sterrett, on repayment; (2) the communication of this arrangement to bystanders, with a view to, and with the effect of, inducing them to refrain from bidding; (3) the consequent acquisition of the
land by Huston at a price less than that
which it would otherwise have brought;
and (4) the subsequent repudiation of the
understanding by Huston.
It is so well settled that the co-existence
of the first, third and fourth of these facts
would not raise a trust, whether to be
termed resulting or ex maleficio, that it is
-useless to expend time and labor on proving the thesis. It is important, however,
to learn whether Huston did, by means of
the circulation of the report that he was
going to buy for Sterrett, induce possible
bidders to refrain from competing with
him, and so procure the land at less than
a normal price, and if so, what the legal
effect thereof would be.
It appears that it was agreed between
Huston and Sterrett that they should
cause bystanders to know that the former
was buying for the latter, that they did as
they agreed, and that bidders refrained

from bidding. It is not clear that the
bidders' refraining was due to the information thus obtained, nor is it apparent that
the land was sold for less than it would
have sold for, but for the infQrmation. It
is easy and perhaps just to suspect, that
the land was sold for less than it would
have been, but a higher measure of evidence is necessary than that which awakens merely a suspicion.
All the facts
necessary to raise a trust 9hould be made
clear, precise and indubitable. The evidence of them should be clear, explicit and
unequivocal, Kimmel v. Smith, 117 Pa.
183; Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. 279; McGinity
v. ,cGinity, 63 Pa. 38. We think the
trial court erred in allowing the jury to
find that the bystanders refrained from
bidding, because of the information imparted to them, and that but for it, 'ome
of them would have bidden more than the
sum at which Huston became the purchaser. To infer from the fact that only
two bids were made, that others must
have been prevented is simply to speculate. How many persons were at the sale?
Of these, how many had had thoughts of
buying the land? May not the price bid
by the second bidder have been as much
as any of those present thought the land
worth? If the right of Sterrett to the
premises depends on the use of means to
depress thfe price, surely better evidence
ought to have been offered of the use and
effectiveness of this means. The fact that
Sterrett is now willing to pay the price
bid plus interest, can from no point of
view be relevant. It would not show even
that in his opinion, it was worth more
than the bid. As he has had possession
of the premises, his tender of interest cannot even suggest that he thinks the land
was undersold. Besides, his own opinion
of the value of the land at the sale is Irrelevant, and more so, were that possible, his
opinion of its value when he made the
offer.

Our conclusion being that there was not
sufficient evidence to jtistify the inference
of a depression of the price, it is scarcely
necessary to consider what would have
been the effect of such depression. There
are cases which hold that it would make
the purchaser a trustee for the defendant
in the execution. Cook v. Cook, 69 Pa
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443;, Of. Kennel v. Smith, 117 Pa. 183.
As the price could not be depressed without injury to creditors whose liens would,
in consequence not be paid, it is difficult
to understand how an enforceable trust in
favor of the debtor could arise from a
transaction by which he would defraud
his creditors. It ought, we think, to be
made to appear that the price actually
bid was enough to discharge all liens on
the premises and that the sale of the land
at the reduced price would be a loss to the
debtor and not to his creditors before the
courts should sustain a trust in favor of
the debtor.
The learned court below fails to find in
thA facts attending the sale, sufficient
cause for attaching a trust to the estate of
the purchaser *Husto4, but finds such
cause in Huston's subsequent refusal to
recognize the right of Sterrett.
Some
cases, it is true, hold the subsequent repudiation of the purchaser's promise to be
the fraud which converts him into a trustee. Cowperthwaite v. Nat. Bank, 102
Pa. 897; Walford v. Herrington, 86 Pa. 36.
Others, e. g., Kimmel v. Smith, 117 Pa.
183; Kellum v. Smith, 33 Pa. 158, deny
this proposition, and with reason. The
subsequent repudiation does not create the
trust, but simply makes resort to the
courts necessary to obtain a judicial vindication of it.
Had it adequately appeared that Huston
obtained the premises at less than the price
at which he would have, by reason of his
publishingthat he was buying for Sterrett,
and that the additional sum which, but
for this publication he would have been
obliged to pay, would have been payable
to Sterrett, a trust, we think, would have
been established. The evidence actually
presented was wholly insufficient.
Judgment reversed.
FARMERS'

BANK vs. HENRY
STONE.

Presumption of receipt of letter from its
deposit inpostoffice-Questionoflaw and
fact-Discount of note.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.,
The bank discounted, June 17, 1895, a
note for one thousand (1,000) dollars,
drawn by James Slape and endorsed by

Stone,-at three (3) months. When it matured a second note was drawn up, with
the amount left vacant, and sent to Stone,
who lived at Shippensburg, for his endorsement. He endorsed it and sent it
back to Slape, and the note was then filled
up with five hundred (500) dollars and
signed by him, and, he testified, sent to
Carlisle by mail, addressed to the cashier
of the bank. A letter accompanied it
with two (2) one hundred-dollar treasury
notes, and a request for renewal of the
document and a credit of two hundred
(200) dollars on the renewal note.
The bank discounted the renewal note,
but did not give credit for two hundred
(200) dollars, denying that it had received
that or any other sum.
The court instructed the jury that the
bank was entitled to receive the five hundred (600) dollars, with interest.
TRUDE and THORNE for appellant.
1. Question as to receipt of letter is a
question of fact, and should have been
submitted to the jury. Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 37 Pa. 293; Liggett v. R. R., 143
Pa. 39; Finck v. Macliillin, 160 Pa. 553 ;
Weaver v. Craighead, 104 Pa. 288; Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 140 Pa. 407.
Jos. RHODES and GERBER for appellee.
1. It is a preliminary question for court
whether there is sufficieit evidence to go
to the jury. Hyatt v. Johnson, 91 Pa.
196; Allen v. Line, 11 Sup. Ct. 517.
2. When evidence is on one side it is a
question for the court. Express Co. v.
Wile, 64 Pa. 201; Ruby v. Cell, 85 Pa., 80.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an appeal by Henry Slape, defendant in above named case, from the
decision of the court below on the ground
that this question was not submitted to
thejury: Didthe defendant, HenrySlape,
send renewal note, accompanied by a letter containing two one hundred-dollar
treasury notes, and a request for renewal
of discount and a credit of $200, and if so,
did bank receive them? These are the
facts in the above case: Slape testified that
he sent them, properly addressed and prepaid, and the bank testified that it had
not received it or any other sum. The
court below instructed the jury that the
bank was entitled to receive the $500, with
interest. There is but one question to decide-whether the court below erred in
not submitting the question to the jury.
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In a case, the facts of which are somewhat similar, Mr. Justice Sterrett (Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405), affirming
the court below, held : "That well-settled
fact of depositing in a postofflice a properly
addressed, prepaid letter raises a natural
presumption, founded in common experience, that it reaches its destination by
due course of mail. In other words, it is
primafacieevidence that it was received
by the person to whom it was sent; but
that proof may be rebutted by evidence
showing that it was not received. The
question is necessarily one of fact soI.rEY
for the determination of the JURY. under
all the evidence." This is the ,law in
Pennsylvania as is shown by the following
cases: Jensin v. McCorkell, 154 Pa. 323 ;
Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405; Folson
v. Cook, 115 Pa. 539; Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy Co., 97 Pa. 425. These cases
hold conclusively that the above question
is for the jury, and as the court below has
not allowed the Jury to pass on a question
which only they can determine, .the judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de
novo awarded.
WM. HENRY KI:RN, J.
GEORGE RYND vs. AMOS HOME.
Action in ejeetment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Sibley owned tract A and Win.
Jones tract B. They agreed to exchange
these tracts, Jones paying Sibley $1,000 in
money. Sibley made a deed to Jones for
tract A and Jones to Sibley for tract B,
each with general warranty. Subsequently
Sibley sold tract B to Rynd. Charles
AdamA, claiming a better title to the land
than Jones, recovered tract B from Rynd
in ejectment. Rynd then brought this
ejectment against Home for tract A, which
Home had purchased from Jones.
OSBORNE and BONTON for plaintiff.

1. Where there is a technical exchange
of lands the law annexes not a mere implied covenant of warranty, but an actual
warranty, with a condition of re-entry.
Gamble v. McClure, 69 Pa. 282.
2. When one party to a contract does
not get that which by the terms of the
contract he was entitled to receive, for
which his deed of general warranty was
given in exchange for another, which was

defective, the consideration fails. Eagan
v. Cull, 24 Pa.236; Reegelv. Life Ins. Co.,
133 Pa. 134; Oakford v. Nixon, 177 Pa. 76.
LONEGAN and MAYS for defendant.
1. Breach of a covenant of general warranty gives rise to an action of damages
only. McClure's Executors v. Gamble,
27 Pa. 288; 3 Wash. on Real Property 468.
2. The general warranty is a personal
obigation, binding upon the warrantor
and his personal rel)resentatives only.
Tiedeman on Real Property, 857.
3. There must be proof of title existing
in the plaintiff at the time suit is brought
or there can be no recovery in ejectment.
Lawrence v. Hunter, 9 Watts 64.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is a deed purporting to be an "exchange," a method of convevanci ng nearly
obsolete in English Jurisprudence, and to
which peculiar properties attach, among
them being the i:ight of re'-entry upon
failurof consideration, this implying the
co-relative right of ejectment in case the
possession be withheld.
But, as was held in the Commentaries
of Littleton, 511, B, "the word 'exchange'
must be used, it is individually requisite,
and cannot besupplied by any other word."
This statement of the law has been followed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Dean v. Shelly, 57 Pa. 427, and in
Gamble v. McClure, 69 Pa. 284, the court
saying that this method of conveyancing
had practically fallen into disrepute, for
the reason thatin such method each party
was bound to inquire not only into the
other's title, but in his own as well. The
warranty that follows the technical "exchange" is a special warranty, and has
these properties, which are different from
another warranty :
First. It being a warranty based on
mutual consideration, it can extend only
to land reciprocally given. Rawle on Covenants of Title, page 444.
Second. No one can exercise the right
to re-entry except the exchangee. Ways,
Maxims, 61; Dean v. Shelly, 57 Pa. 427.
Third. It is necessary that one tract be
given in consideration for the other,
hence, if it is partly in consideration for
the other, the technical "exchange" is
not consummated. Rawle's Covenants of
Title, page 445.
Wa have then in the case at bar not an
"exchange," because tract A was given
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not for tract B alone, but for the latter
and $1,000; and further, since this method
is obsolete, there must be clear and positive proof it was such, which was not
shown.
The action of ejectment is not the proper
method of procedure; unless the deed be
an "exchange" the action must be on the
covenants. Gamble v. McClure, supra.
The above reasons, together with the
fact (found in the last mentioned case)
that in case of " exchange" the action of
ejectment can be brought only by the exchangee, and not by his alienee, furnishes
us with sufficient reasons for entering
judgment for the defendant.
WILL. W. JOHNSTON, J.

R. S. WAY'S EXECUTORS vs. BEST
ET AL.
Action in ejeetment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1865 Way bought a tract of land in
Penn township containing 233 acres. Way
died in 1890 testate.
In 1892 Best sold 6 lots of ground which
was originally in the draft and deed to
Way. In 1896 he also sold another lot,
being the balance of the land. He gave
deeds to the parties. No title is recited in
any of the deeds. The executors brought
an action of ejectment to get possession of
this land in 1890.
The whole tract was assessed and taxes
paid by Way and his executors since 1865.
No claim was ever made before for this
property. Way lived on the land from
1865 to 1890.
Best has had possession of the lots since
1878 and has had them assessed in his
name and paid taxes. Best's grantees
have since paid the taxes and made valuable improvements.
DAViS and DT'RICo

for plaintiff.

1. The defendants not being in possession for the statutory period (twenty-one
years), they have no title in the land as
against plaintiff. Tiedeman on Real Property. 671; Bradford v. McCastin, 4 Brew.
351; Pederick v. Pearle, 5 S. & R. 236.
2. The action having been brought in
1890, within twenty-one years, the statute
stops running, and plaintiff is entitled to
judgment. Trickett's Law of Limitations
in Pa., 108; Act of Nov. 26, 1785; P. & L.

Dig. 1, 2676; Hinman v. Crammer, 9 Pa.
40; Groft v. Weakland, 34 Pa. 304; Oheson
v. Patterson, 29 Pa.- 26; Weaver v. Wible,
72 Pa. 469.
MACCONNELL and BROCK for defendant.
1. The adverse possession was continuous, there being rrivity of title between
grantor, Best, and grantees. 5 S. & R.
240; 8 Watts, 403; 34 Pa. 38; 13 John 229;
23 Wend 316; 5 S. & R. 254.
2. The fact that an action in ejectment
was brought, which either was not successful or not enforced, will not take the case
out of the statute of limitations. 13 John
229; 3 Binney 385.
3. Actual occupation of land for twentyone years, however tortious or destitute of
color of title gives a right to the extent, of
the enclosure against all the world, except
the state. 10 S. & R. 334.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
We have here an action of ejectment
brought by the executors of R. S. Way
for the possession and to determine the
title of a piece of ground occupied and
claimed by D. C. Best and others, holding
under grants of said Best, the material
facts of the case are as follows:
Way boughta tract of land containing 233
acres in 1865, from whom or what title he
got does not appear, the statement being
very meagre as well as incompleteas to this
and other material points of the case, we
cannot afford to speculate in the least, but
must confine ourselves to the facts as
stated. In 1878 Best had possession of a
portion of this tract; how he got possession
or for what length of time previous to this
does not appear, so his possession must
be reckoned from that date.
In 1882, 14 years after, Best sold a portion of what he occupied. In 1890 Way
died testate. The provisions of the will
are also unknown, and in that year his
executors brought an action of ejectment
for the land in question, the result of which
is also unknown. Then in 1896 Best sold
the remaining portion of the land; now in
1900 a second action of ejectment is brought
by the executors.
This case presents to our minds two
points of law:
First. Did the title of Best and his
grantees ripen into a fee by the statute of
limitations? We think that it did, as
there being no return in the summons in
ejectment, and in the absence of a statement that Best removed from the prem
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ises, he must be considered in possession.
Then, further, we are told by the statement of facts that in the grants by Best
he recited no title in the deed, so whatever
title he had must have remained in him.
The counsel for the plaintiff contends
that the action brought in 1890 was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
Ve think not, as where a person having
recovered in an action of ejectment neglects
to enforce it within the period required by
the statute, his right to enter under that
judgment is altogether gone, and if there
has been adverse possession for twenty-one
years, during which time such judgment
was recovered, it will not avail him to
take it out of the statute. He having slept
until his term of entry had expired, he
now stands in the same relation to the
defendant as if they had never attempted
a legal remedy by a former suit. Jackson
v. Haviland, 13 Johnson 229.
,Second. But, who is the plaintiff? Way
died testate and the plaintiffs are the executors of his will, and as such acquire no
right or title to the realty. There is nothing
to show that the .land in question was
devised to them, or that they bought, or
that they were agents for the devisor
under the will, or that they hold in trust
for any of them; consequently the plaintifis title is not sufficient to oust anyone
in possession of the land.
The rule that the plaintiff In ejectment
must recover upon the strength of his own
title is too well settled to need further discussion. Boneffon v. Peters, 25 W. N. C.
537.
The only power an executor has to maintain such an action i§ given to him by
statute, and this is to enforce the payment
of purchase money due and owing on land
contracts. Act April 9, 1849, S. 5, P. L.
526.
Therefore we have a plaintiff in court
who is acting beyond his power, and must
give judgment for defendant.
PIPER, J.
ALBERT JACKSON vs. THOMAS
BROWN.

Lien tract-Acceptance of senices-lmplied promise to payfor same-Commission.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Albert Jackson, a real estate agent,
claims a commission of $550 for renting
the hotel property of Thomas Brown.
Jackson was told by Brown that he rented
his own properties and would pay him no
commission if he rented the place. Jackson brought a party to Brown, who conducted negotiations with him (the agefit)
with the object in view of renting the
property. Before the property was rented
the party brought to the owner by Jackson, saw Brown and closed the deal with
him personally and took possession of the
property. Before these negotiations were
begun Jackson had another party looking
.at the house who refused to take it, thinking the rental figure too high, at which
time Brown said to Jackson: "Never
mind, Mr. Jackson, you may have another opportunity to rent the property."
Brown claims that he told Jackson that no
commission would be paid, that he did not
employ him to rent the house and is under
no obligation to pay him commission.
Jackson claims that he was impliedly employed by Brown, that he accepted his
party as a tenant and is therefore entitled
to his commission.
W. H. TAYLOR and MINIICH for plaintiff.
1. When a person accepts the benefits of
the services of another there is an implied
promise to pay for them. Curry v. Curry,
114 Pa. 367; Com. v. Buchanan, 6 Kulp
217; Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107;
Kidder v. Boom Co., 24 Pa. 193; Kentucky
Bank v. Combs, 7 Pa. 543.
BARR and BOR.YER for defendant.
P laintiff should be non-suited for:
1. The law will not create a contract
between two persons, when there is no intention on the part of the one toenterinto
legal relations, though he accepts of the
services or the goods. 123 Mass. 28.
2. Authority to the act for which the
plaintiff claims compensation having
been expressly withheld he was a mere
volunteer, and as such cannot recover
though the act was beneficial to the defendant. Anderson v. Hamilton Township, 2.5 Pa. 75; Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa.
408, Webb v. School, 3 Phila. 125.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, claims
that he was impliedly employed by the
defendant to rent his hotel property; that
his party was accepted as a tenant, and
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that he is, therefore, entitled to his commission.
The defendant refuses to compensate
the plaintiff for his alleged services on the
ground that he did not employ him, and
that he informed the plaintiff that he
rented his own properties and 'would pay
him no commission if he rented the place.
Is there such an implied contract as will
permit the plaintiff to recover?
Where services are performed by one
for another, either with or without the
latter's consent and knowledge, and he
knowingly accepts and avails himself of
these services, the law will imply a
promise to pay a fair and reasonable compensation therefor. Com. v. Buchanan,
6 Kulp 217; Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367;
Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107. But no
contract will be implied unless the party
receiving the benefits is entirely free to
elect whether he will or will not accept
the work. Zottman v. San Francisco, 20
Cal. 96. If, after the defendant had expressly stated that he would not compensate the plaintiff for his services, a contract could be implied from the fact that
the plaintiff had conducted negotiations
with a party who subsequently rented the
place from the defendant, in order to avoid
liability, would be compelled to refuse to
rent his property to anyone with whom
the plaintiff had been negotiating. In
such case, the defendant would not be
free to select his own tenant without incurring some liability. The mere retention and use of the benefit resulting from
the work, where no such power or freedom of election exists, does not constitute
such evidence of acceptance that the law
will imply therefrom a promise of. payment. Zottnian v. San Francisco, supra.
The fact that the defendant said "Never
mind, Mr. Jackson, you may have another opportunity to rent the property,"
would not be sufficient to establish an implied contract since the plaintiff had been
informed that no commission would be
paid to him. A promise will not be implied against the express declaration of a
person upon whom no duty is imposed by
law. Earle v. Coburn, 130 Mass. 596.
It is well established in Pennsylvania
that services rendered without request
and without a subsequent promise to pay

shall be deemed voluntary, and that no
compensation can be recovered for such
services whether the person performs the
services with or without expectation of reward. Webb v. School, 3 Phila. 125; Anderson v. Hamilton Township, 25 Pa. 75.
That the plaintiff expected to be paid for
the work would certainly not be sufficient
to establish the existence of a contract. It
must be shown that, in some manner, the
party sought to be charged assented to 'it.
Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513.
A voluntary act, although beneficial to
another, performed without request, affords no legal cause of action for compensation. Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. 408; Anderson v. Hamilton To I nship, supra;
Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28;
Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 John. 28.
Since the law will not impose an obligation upon the defendant to compensate
plaintiff, judgment is, therefore, rendered
accordingly.
SAmUEL E. BASEHORE, J.
IN RE WM. NAI LOR'S ESTATE.
Quasi Contract-Actionfor supportImplied promises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Amos Nallor, John's son, when 45 years
old became infirm, and helpless, and found
his home with Thomas Himes, who for
several weeks treated him kindly and cared
for him. Win. Nailor who lived 60 miles
away, hearing of this, stated to three persons that he would, at his death, make
provision by bequest, for compensation to
Himes if he continued to take careofAmos.
Himes continued to take such care till
Amos' death, but did not hear of William
Nailor's promise until three weeks before
Amos died. He paid the expenses of the
funeral. Win. Nailor dying intestate,
Himes claims in the distribution $60 for
support of Amos before Win. Nalor's
promise, $100 for support between the
promise and the communication of it to
Himes, and $150 for the support following
and the funeral expenses.
MCrNTIRE and GRoss for plaintiff.
1. A valid contract arose between plaintiff and defendant upon the communication of defendantzs offbr, and plaintiff is
therefore entitled to recover for expenses

THE FORUM.
incurred subsequent to that time. Everts
v. Allen & Adams, 10Johns. 353; Chase v.
Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286; Reif v. Paige, 55
Wis. 503.
STERRETT and C. L. KLINE for defendant.
1. Claims against a decedent's estate for
which no claim was made until after the
debtor's death are regarded by the courts
with suspicion. 159 Pa. 590; Conaughton's
Estate, 12 C. C. 590.
2. When one has rendered personal services to another, merely upon the expectation of a legacy promised, without a contract obligation, the promisee takes his
chance of receiving the legacy; and if his
expectations are disappointed, he call recover nothing. Miller's Estate, 136 Pa.
239.
3. A special promise to answer for the
debt of another is within the Statute of
Frauds. Nugent v. Wolf, II Pa. 471;
Boston v. Farr, 148 Pa. 220; Jack v. Morrison, 48 Pa. 113; Lewis v. Lumber Co.,
156 Pa. 217; Miller v. Long, 45 Pa. 350;
Statute of Frauds, B, Purd., 724, 4.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The temptations to set up claims against
the estates of decedents, particularly such
as have no lineal heirs, is very great.
The case before us, in the form of exceptions to an auditor's reportdisallowing the
claims of plaintiff, is one of this numerous
class.
Volunitary services in the way of charity,
succor to the poor, help to the distressed
and relief to the needy, when done gratuitously and not with the expectation of reward or bequest, are certainly worthy of
commendation, as they are evidences of
man's realization of his moral obligation
to man. But when done with the expectation of a legacy. as the services of
Himesseem without a doubt to have been;
they lose their effect as acts to be praised.
Himes apparently comes before this
court as a disappointed legatee, and now
tries to establish a claim against the decedent's estate for services done gratuitously to a third party, alleging a contract
on the part of the decedent to pay for such
services.
Himes acted nobly, and, even though
the services were beneficial, we think his
claim has no merit in court.
A subsequent change of intention by
him after the alleged promise by William
Nailor to recompense him, after he indirectly acquires knowledge of such promise
to neighbors, does not alter the rule.
One great reason that leads us to believe
Himes expected a legacy is that he delayed making his claim until the death of
Wim.Nailor. If the relation of debtor and
creditor was really established in the mind
of Himes, there is no reason why he should
inot have pressed it in the lifetime of the
decedent.
Hanna, J., in Conaughton's Estate, 12
C. C. 590, says: "Claims for services against

the estate of a decedent, and not presented
in decedent's lifetime, are regarded by the
courts with suspicion." Ashman, J., in
Sayers' Estate, 8 C. C. 32, says: " When
services were rendered at first from motives of neighborly kindness the presurnption is that the original relation continued,
in the absence of proof to the contrary."
These reasons, we think, are sufficient to
taint the plaintiff's claim with suspicion.
There are two questions that will naturally arise in this case, and on which we
will decide it.
First. Was there an express contract?
We say not, as there is noproof of an offer
and acceptance. Even if such were the
case, it would come under the Statute of
Frauds. B, Purd. Dig., 724, P4.
Secondly. Was there an implied or quasicontractualrelation established sufficient
to warrant a recovery? We think not.
Lowrie, C. J., in Hertzog v. Hertzog,
clearly defines constructive, express and
implied contracts. Express, which arise
under circumstances which, according to
the ordinary course of dealing and common understanding of men, shows a mutual intent to contract.
Every induction, inference, implication
in reason, of any kind is a logical conclusion derived from and demanded by certain data and circumstances. If such circumstances demand the conclusion of a
contract, express or implied, to account
for them, a contract is proved. According
to all the evidence Hinies has not proved
his contract, express or implied.
Unless we assume a very close relationship between William and John Nailor
the case must fall. We have no knowledge of any such relation, and hence will
consider them as comparative straneers.
We do not mean by this that if there had
been a close relationship there might have
been a recovery of at least the funeral expenses, but we do mean that there would
have been some merit in the case.
From 4 Dall. 111:5 W. & S. .357; 24 W.
N. C. 175; 111 Pa. 460; 85 Pa. 428; 136 Pa.
239, to 141 Pa. 58, the authoritieq agree in
this one point, "that when one has rendered services merely upon expectation of
a legacy promised, without a contractual
obligation, the promisee takes his chances
of receiving the legacy, and if his expectation is disappointed he can recover nothing."
It may seem unfortunate and unjust
that one who has done a charitable act,
such as this. should go unrewarded, but
since the claimant, Iimes. comes before
us for compensation which he might have
attempted to recover in the lifetime of the
decedent, which creates suspieion, having
failed ahbolutely in establishing an express
or implied quasi contract, we can do nothine else but treat him as a disappointed
legatee,and therefore confirm the auditor's
report, which disallowed the claims of
GRAUL, J.
plaintiff, Himes.

